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Bribes v. Bombs: A Study in Coasean Warfare
Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman*
ABSTRACT
September 3, 2007
The use of bribes to co-opt an enemy’s forces can be a more effective way to wage war than the
conventional use of force: Relative to bombs, bribes can save lives and resources, and preserve
civic institutions. This essay evaluates the efficacy and normative desirability of selectively
substituting bribes for bombs as a means of warfare. We show how inter-country disparities in
wealth, differences in military strength, the organization of the bribing and recipient forces,
uncertainty about the outcome of the conflict, and communications technology can contribute to
the efficacy of bribes. We discuss methods for enforcing bargains struck between opposing
forces, a key problem in structuring bribes. We also examine the legal status of bribe agreements,
under both international and U.S. law. While the former apparently views bribery as legitimate
means of warfare, the latter poses a potentially significant obstacle by refusing on public policy
grounds to enforce secret contracts made with foreign agents.
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INTRODUCTION
Can bribes be more effective than bombs in fighting wars? This is not a purely theoretical
question: during the second Gulf war, the United States apparently bribed Iraqi generals not to
resist the US invasion. General Tommy Franks, commander of US forces, told one reporter “I
had letters from Iraqi generals saying, ‘I now work for you’” after the US paid them substantial
sums of money not to order their troops into combat (Kaplan, 2003: We have not been able to
find any other information on this topic.). Although it is unclear how much such bribes shortened
the duration or cost of the military campaign, we strongly suspect that they lowered the total cost
of the war. Moreover, the failure to continue paying the salaries of the Iraqi army at the
conclusion of hostilities—a kind of post-conflict bribe—is widely blamed for helping fuel the
subsequent development of the insurgent movement in Iraq (Peter Slevin (2003), Edmund L.
Andrews (2007), L. Paul Bremer (2007).
The use of bribes is by no means limited to the US, or to the Iraq war, however: bribes have
been used throughout history (albeit with varying degrees of success), including most-recently by
the British in an apparently unsuccessful attempt to induce Taliban leaders in Afghanistan to
surrender. (Lamb (2007). We discuss some of the reasons why the British effort seems to have
been less successful than the American bribery campaign in Section 1.2.) Moreover, bribery will
almost certainly grow in importance in future conflicts. For example, in 2005, the U.S.
Congress—apparently for the first time—explicitly authorized $25 million in funds to “to
provide support to foreign forces, irregular forces, groups, or individuals engaged in supporting
or facilitating ongoing military operations by United States special operations forces to combat
terrorism.”1
In this essay, we examine the efficacy, efficiency and legality of bribes as a means of
warfare. We demonstrate that bribes can often be superior to conventional combat in conducting
military campaigns. The use of bribes can minimize costs on both sides by saving human lives,
preventing the destruction of property, and forestalling the erosion of governmental institutions
and civic culture that so often accompany modern warfare.2 We analyze the conditions under

1

§1208(a) of Public Law 108-375, 108th Congress, 118 Stat. 1811 (October 28, 2004). For
what it’s worth, we also note that the Europa Barbarorum online computer game (devoted to
Roman Empire military strategy) explicitly allows for bribing enemy generals. See,
http://www.twcenter.net/forums/showthread.php?t=102589.
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Startlingly, Edward Miguel and Gérard Roland conclude that there was “no robust longterm effect of the [American] bombing [of Vietnam during the Vietnamese War] on local
poverty, consumption or population density . . . a quarter century after the end of the ‘American
War.’”Bombing Vietnam: The Phoenix Rises, 8 MILKEN INSTITUTE REVIEW 18, 30 (2006). Other
studies find the same kinds of results for Japan and Germany in the aftermath of World War II.
See, for example, Donald R. Davis and David W. Weinstein, Bones, Bombs, and Break Points:
the Geography of Economic Activity, 92 AMER . ECON. REV . 1269 (2002) (concluding that longrun city size is robust to temporary shocks, even very large ones such as US bombing of Japanese
cities during WWII). Steven Brakman, Harry Garretsen, and Marc Schramm, The Strategic
Bombing of German Cities During WW II and its Impact on City Growth, 4 J. ECON.
1

which bribes dominate bombs as a means of waging military campaigns and discuss some of the
historical evidence for the use of bribes during warfare.
Although bribes can take many forms, we limit ourselves to a narrow definition: an
agreement between one country and members of the armed forces of its military opponent, under
which the latter promises to refrain from participating in conflict in exchange for payment from
the former. Seen in this light, bribes represent a kind of “Coasean warfare,” in which bargaining
over entitlements (in this case, the right to send troops into battle) is used in conjunction with
military force to wage war.
Like all agreements, the efficacy of military bribes depends crucially on the ability of the
briber and the recipient to credibly commit to performing their respective ends of the bargain.
The briber must convince the recipient that he will pay the promised bribe and let the recipient
keep the money at the end of the military campaign. The recipient must guarantee that he will not
take the offered money and continue to fight. What makes bribe agreements interesting from a
contract theory standpoint is that much of the legal and institutional machinery that supports
ordinary contractual enforcement is seemingly unavailable in the case of military bribes. (But see
Section 2.3 for a discussion of the extent to which this might not be true.) Consequently,
enforcement must be achieved in large part by other means.
Notwithstanding the enforceability challenge, we show that bribes may be employed in
many armed conflicts, and moreover, that in some circumstances, they may be more effective
than conventional weapons. Unlike bombs, bribes do not use up any real resources; they are pure
transfers that do not involve economic costs. Furthermore, from the point of view of the paying
country, bribes can realize considerable cost savings both in lives and in money relative to actual
fighting. The amounts paid will often be considerably lower than the cost of standard warfare;
and as we demonstrate, even rumors about widespread bribing alone can help achieve victory
through a kind of “tipping” phenomenon, much like the mechanism Thomas Schelling used to
model residential segregation. If enemy forces believe that fellow-combatants have received
bribes, this alone can weaken their resolve to fight on. Finally, bribes minimize negative long
term effects—they lower the probability of long term animosity and retaliation by the enemy
population.
It is important to note, however, that bribes are more of a complement than a substitute for
military might. Countries cannot rely on bribes alone to win campaigns—bribes can best be used
to supplement (the threat of) standard warfare. A country without a strong army cannot employ
bribes very effectively because the lack of enforceability means that enemy generals will be
tempted to pocket whatever bribes they receive and continue to fight. Likewise, bribes will be
most effective when the offering country is likely to win the war, but may face serious military
resistance in doing so. Accordingly, it is not surprising that the U.S. reportedly employed bribes
in the second Gulf war but not, for example, in the conflict with Grenada.

GEOGRAPHY 201 (2004) (concluding that bombing had a significant, but only temporary, effect
on city growth in Germany after the second world war). The studies do not demonstrate that the
bombings had no overall effect—it is possible that the recovery of bombed cities was only made
possible by diversion of resources from elsewhere in the economy, so that even though no
particular city suffered long term economic consequences, the economy as a whole did.
2

Moreover, bribes will not work equally well in all military conflicts. They are most effective
in conflicts between organized armies and much less so when one of the combatants is a guerilla
force. Ideology and patriotism also affect the efficacy of bribes, although with an indeterminate
sign. Enemy generals are unlikely to accept bribes from an enemy whose ideology conflicts with
their own strongly-held religious beliefs or cultural values. On the other hand, one can imagine
that some generals might find themselves fighting for a regime to which they had no loyalty
whatever; think of some German generals in World War II. Such actors might be quite willing to
accept bribes in return for refusing to fight. What little quantitative evidence there is on these
questions suggests that ideological motivations are relatively unimportant compared to pecuniary
ones—at least in contemporary civil wars in poor countries (Paul Collier [2007], Chapter 2)—
which seems to offer widespread scope for bribery.
But is the use of bribes legal? Under public international law, the answer is almost certainly
“yes.” Public international law condones the use of bribes as a means of warfare, drawing a
distinction between forbidden “perfidy” and permitted “ruses of war.” Perfidy is defined as the
killing or wounding “treacherously individuals belonging to the hostile nation or army” (Hague
Convention IV, Annex art 23(b)) or as “[a]cts inviting the confidence of an adversary to lead him
to believe that he is entitled to, or is obliged to accord, protection under the rules of international
law applicable in armed conflict, with intent to betray that confidence.”3 Ruses of war, by
contrast, are defined broadly to encompass any deceptive measures employed in a military
conflict in order to mislead the enemy or gain a military advantage. (Hague Convention IV,
Annex art 24.) The use of spies and secret agents, the inducement of enemy soldiers to desert,
surrender or rebel and even the use of bribes are all listed as examples of legitimate ruses of war
(Department of the Army (1956), at 22 para. 49).
Ironically, it is our own national law that may obstruct the use of bribes, and lessen the
effectiveness of this technique of warfare. In a recent decision, Tenet v. Doe (544 U.S. 1 [2005]),
the Supreme Court ruled that public policy concerns should bar foreign agents from enforcing the
terms of their secret contracts with the government in U.S. courts. This decision undermines the
ability of the U.S. government to credibly commit to perform its obligations towards bribe
recipients, and thus reduces the incentives for enemy generals to enter deals with the U.S.
government. Hence, we conclude the Essay with a call for the reversal of this decision.
Structurally, the Essay unfolds in three parts. In part 1, we explore the efficiency gains
generated by the use of bribes and review various historic examples of bribery in times of war. In
part 2, we analyze bribery as a contracting problem. We discuss the various challenges facing
bribe agreements and explain the extra-legal and legal mechanism that may be used to overcome
those challenges. In Part 3, we discuss factors advising against the use of bribes. A short
conclusion follows.

3

1977 Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 art 37. This
might include, for example, the (false) use of a flag of truce to obtain a military advantage. Note
that the U.S. is not a party to Protocol I; the distinction between ruses of war and perfidy is a
traditional one, however, and Protocol I is apparently fairly reflective of the status of customary
international law.
3

1. BRIBES V. BOMBS
1.1 The Gains from Bribery
1.1.1. Inefficiency of Warfare Generally
Although there will sometimes be groups within a country that manage to realize gains from
war (which makes the Pareto criterion inoperative), it is clear that warfare is almost inherently
wasteful.4 Political scientist Robert Powell (2006, at 169) follows the general assumption and
ignores within-country distributional issues when he writes that
[b]ecause fighting typically destroys resources, the ‘pie’ to be divided after
the fighting begins is smaller than it was before the war started. This means
that there are usually divisions of the larger pie that would have given each
belligerent more than it will have after the fighting. Fighting, therefore, leads
to a Pareto-inferior or inefficient outcome.
Like labor strikes or failed settlement negotiations in litigation, the existence of war can thus
be seen as a kind of bargaining failure.5 While the precise nature of the bargaining failures that
lead to war is an important topic for international relations theorists, it is not our major concern
here.6
4

Some people or factions presumably do gain from war, so ending war would make them
worse off. If the opponents of war gain more from its end than the proponents lose, then an end
to the hostilities is Kaldor-Hicks efficient or wealth-maximizing, Instead, most models typically
assume that the warring states are in some sense unitary actors, largely finessing the possible
internal division of the gains and losses from war. It is always possible to assume that wars
occur because a powerful group that benefits from war imposes its will on country, despite the
losses war creates for the population as a whole.
5

Robert Cooter (1982), identifies strategic bargaining as a key form of transactions costs that
can lead to the failure of parties to reach mutually beneficial agreements or avoid mutually
detrimental consequences. For more on inefficiencies in bargaining generally, see Martin
Osborne and Ariel Rubinstein (1990).
6

Dagobert L. Brito and Michael Intriligator (1985) offer a game-theoretic analysis that
allows for “redistribution” (or what amounts to bribes between countries) as an alternative to
warfare. They predict that if countries are fully-informed about each other’s strength, they will
efficiently avoid going to war; redistribution will occur without the actual use of force, although
it is of course the threat of force that forces concessions. When one country is not informed about
the other’s willingness or ability to fight, however, wars can occur “if the uninformed country
adopts a separating equilibrium strategy, in which it precommits itself to a positive probability of
war in order to prevent bluffing by the informed country” (Brito and Intriligator, at 945).
Powell argues convincingly that such asymmetric information stories, while important, can
not explain many important aspects of warfare. For one thing, “fighting [often] does not seem to
result from some residual uncertainty about an adversary that has yet to be resolved. Fighting
ensues when the resolution of uncertainty reveals that a state is facing an adversary that it would
rather fight than accommodate” (Powell, at 174-5). For another, asymmetric information theories
seem incapable of explaining why many wars last so much longer than would seem to be
4

We proceed on the assumption that because war is almost always inefficient, there may be
room for a “partial” bargain that, even if it does not eliminate the struggle itself, can increase the
welfare of both sides. Although the U.S. might not have been able to convince Iraq to surrender
peacefully and thus avoid the second Gulf war, it could—and according to reports, actually
did—approach this result by selectively bribing Iraqi generals, thereby shortening the duration
and intensity of the campaign. Even in war, there may often be a potential bargaining surplus that
can be partially reclaimed by (selectively) deploying non-destructive means to achieve what
would otherwise be realized through the destructive methods of warfare. In other words, bribery
may be second-best (constrained) optimal, where the first-best solution (to avoid war altogether
and negotiate instead) is for some reason not available. The inefficiency of war—the fact that it
represents failure of “Coasean” bargaining—sets the stage for our analysis of bribery.
Some readers may have reservations about the use of efficiency in our analysis. After all, if
country X decides to invade and conquer country Y, it would seem odd for Y’s leaders to include
losses to X as costs (rather than benefits) in their welfare calculus. It should be emphasized,
though, that we do not suggest that counties making the decision to go to war should engage in a
total two-country welfare calculus based on benign supra-national considerations, any more than
contracting parties generally “should” take into account a contract’s benefits for their negotiating
partner. Nor do we argue that war is never justified or appropriate; on the contrary, we readily
admit that some wars are necessary. Our point is only that because war is destructive to both
sides, there will often be possibilities for both sides to gain from avoiding it. In cases where
alternatives to war are thwarted—say, by a tyrannical leader who is determined to take his
country into war regardless of the consequences—efficiency will be enhanced if the overthrow of
that leader is attained via bribes that spare lives and resources, as opposed to standard warfare
that occasions death and destruction. Moreover, the fact that the tyrant’s actions are likely to
cause losses for his own side makes it easier for the other side to bribe the tyrant’s troops: the
more costly the war, the more willing high-ranking officers should be to abandon it.
Of course, agreements between a state and the military leaders in its enemy’s army are beset
by some of the same kinds of enforcement problems that plague agreements between states
themselves. As Powell points out, it is precisely these commitment or enforceability problems
that stand in the way of negotiated alternatives to war in many contexts. But as we suggest below,
it will often be easier for one state to strike an enforceable agreement with an individual military
leader on the other side than it is to enforce an agreement between the two states themselves.
Again, this suggests that bribes paid to opposition generals may be a kind of second-best
alternative to (unenforceable) agreements between states to settle disputes without going to war.
1.1.2. Are Bribes Efficient?
Any voluntary deal between informed, rational persons is efficient (at least as regards those
persons) because, by definition, it makes both of them better off; and since presumably nobody
else is affected by the transaction, gains or losses to A and B are all we need to keep track of.
necessary to reveal information about an adversary’s willingness or ability to fight. Powell’s
positive claim is that even when parties have full information about each other and could design
a negotiated alternative that would be Pareto superior to warfare, there is no way that they can
commit to any such agreement they may reach; it is this lack of enforceability that leads to war.
5

Some bargains do have consequences for non-parties, however, and these are not efficient per se.
Bribing an enemy general to surrender rather than fight has externalities that make it similar
to this second kind of deal. Saddam Hussein and his loyalists were apparently made worse-off by
the willingness of some of his generals to surrender in exchange for cash from the US. In that
sense, the payment of bribes was not Pareto efficient, since we can identify persons (albeit not
parties to the transaction) who suffered a loss as a result. But suppose that the ultimate outcome
of the war was a foregone conclusion with or without bribes, and that all the bribes accomplished
was to produce the same result at a lower cost in Iraqi lives and resources. Given that the
outcome would be an inevitable loss, presumably even Saddam Hussein would prefer losing with
fewer casualties to losing with higher casualties, and if so, bribing generals to surrender might
still be Pareto-efficient, relative to this baseline.7
Because of the externalities involved, it is impossible to be sure that bribing generals to
surrender is Pareto superior to war. But we are much more confident that such bribes are
desirable in the looser, Kaldor-Hicks sense, for several reasons.
First and foremost, a bribe is a transfer payment, rather than a true economic cost. Bombs
(as well as other traditional means of warfare) usually result in the loss of human life and
destruction of resources (on both sides). Paying money from the US Treasury into the bank
account of, say, an Iraqi general is not a true economic cost to the world as a whole. It does not
use up any resources, but only shifts money from one pocket to another. To a first approximation,
no real resources are used up in paying a bribe, and the two parties, taken together, have as much
“stuff” after the fact as they had before the bribe was paid. This means that bribes have positive
efficiency consequences compared to any directly-costly activity for which they substitute. Thus,
it is actually efficient to pay a $1.25 million bribe rather than to fire-off a $1 million cruise
missile that has the same effect, because the former is a mere transfer while the latter is a real
cost.
Second, bribes that prevent fighting can sometimes save the direct costs of weapons or
human capital that would otherwise have to be used to achieve victory. Using a $250,000 bribe
that produces the same overall effect as a $1million cruise missile effects a saving of $750,000 in
direct costs. Of course, bribes cannot always replicate the effects of a conventional weapon for
less than the cost of the weapon itself; but significant cost savings may be realized from the use
of bribes on many occasions. For example, in Linda Bilmes and Joseph E. Stiglitz’s (2006)
recent estimate of the cost to the US of the Iraq war, the human capital costs loom especially
large.8 Of the overall $2 Trillion cost that they estimate, roughly 15 percent is attributable to
human capital losses, including lost lives and injuries to soldiers. By forestalling fighting, bribes
can obviously reduce these personnel costs.
7

Of course, this raises as many questions as it answers. Did Saddam Hussein understand that
he would lose the war with the US? If he did, then why did he fight rather than surrendering? If
he didn’t, then do we fail to credit his preferences (or his information, or his rationality) when we
say that he would be no worse off from our bribing his generals to surrender than if they had
fought and lost instead?
8

Of their total economic cost of the Iraq war (to the US) of $2.2 trillion, $355 billion
represents losses to or depreciation of human capital.
6

Besides their savings in direct costs to the briber, there is a third reason why bribes can be
better than bombs. Warfare almost inevitably causes collateral damage to unintended parties; but
as one source put it, bribes are a “Precision Guided Munition,” meaning that they always hit their
intended target, and nothing else.9 Even cruise missiles sometimes go off course and strike
civilian targets, and precise targeting of other weapons is difficult.10 Avoiding unnecessary harm
to civilians is not only a key element of the law of war,11 it is an obvious moral imperative as
well, and thus represents a key advantage of bribes over bombs.
Finally, in the long run, it will often be strategically advantageous to achieve victory at the
lowest cost in enemy lives or material lost. There may be campaigns when nothing short of an
overwhelming and decisive military defeat of the enemy is desirable (for political or strategic
reasons), but it seems unlikely that the infliction of significant harm on the enemy is itself an
ultimate—rather than merely instrumental—objective in most cases. Each enemy soldier killed
represents a potential source for future revenge, and unnecessary devastation may cause long
term animosity toward the victor.12 This can, in turn, extract a high cost, either by inspiring
continued fighting, or by engendering lingering resentment once fighting subsides. Furthermore,
inflicting devastation on the enemy can adversely impact public opinion in the victorious
country, and may cause support for the cause to dwindle. Bribes provide an effective way to
decide military campaigns without achieving devastation.
1.2.3. A Dynamic Analysis
The discussion so far has been essentially static. From a dynamic perspective, however, the
cost savings from using bribes can be amplified by a “tipping” mechanism similar to the one
Thomas Schelling (1978) first modeled in the context of residential segregation.
Consider General X in country A, a potential recipient of a bribe from a military opponent.
X faces a choice between continuing to fight or accepting (or even soliciting) a bribe for not
fighting. Regardless of whether X fights or surrenders, his expected payoff depends on at least
9

Kaplan (2003) quotes a “senior [Defense Department] official” as saying that “. . . a bribe is
a PGM [precision-guided munition]; it achieves the aim, but it’s bloodless and there's zero
collateral damage.”
10

For example, on May 9, 1999, during the Bosnian conflict, US bombs accidentally struck
the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, killing four embassy staff and causing widespread protests in
China.
11

Article 25 of the 1907 Hague Regulations outlaws direct attacks against non-military
targets. Joint civilian-military targets can be attacked under Article 23(e), but only if appropriate
restraint is shown; the use of “arms, projectiles, or material calculated to cause unnecessary
suffering” is prohibited.
12

Of course, not all vanquished enemies remain hostile. Obvious counter-examples include
the relationship between the defeated Axis powers and the US after WW II. But post-war
animosity and resentment are a frequent problem, as in Germany after WW I, the South after the
US Civil War, or today’s Iraq.
7

two factors: the likelihood that country A ultimately wins, and the share of the war’s costs borne
by him and/or the troops under his command. Bribes paid to generals other than X will thus have
two separate effects on X’s expected payoffs. First, if other generals order their forces to
withdraw from the fight, the probability that A will prevail drops, since it has effectively lost the
ability to deploy troops under the bribed generals’ command. The more the odds of A’s winning
drop, however, the more X will find it attractive not to fight on behalf of a losing cause, and to
accept a bribe instead. Hence, as other generals take bribes to surrender, they make it more
attractive for X to do so as well.
Bribes can help tip the balance in favor of surrendering for a second reason. Even if we
ignore the effect of other generals’ withdrawal on A’s probability of victory, the defection of
other soldiers means that X and his troops now have to bear a higher share of the costs of
whatever fighting does occur. The same enemy now confronts fewer “active” divisions of X’s
army, so whatever divisions remain are likely to suffer higher casualties if they choose to fight.
Naturally, this effect also makes it more attractive for X to accept a bribe to surrender. Suppose,
for example, that each general would choose to fight if he believed that 95 percent of other
generals will make the same choice, and otherwise will surrender. This means that bribing a mere
6 percent of the generals—and making this information known—could lead all the generals to
surrender. This kind of dynamic tipping effect could dramatically increase the efficacy of bribes,
causing the opposition’s resistance to unravel, much as Schelling’s model describes the
unraveling of integrated neighborhoods.13 Somewhat similar dynamic reasoning appears to have
been at work in the recent British efforts to bribe Taliban leaders in Afghanistan. The British
apparently believed that the successful use of force against Taliban leaders would “soften-up” the
opposition and make it more receptive to bribes, which could then presumably yield further
defections.14
Moreover, even spreading (false) rumors about the widespread use of bribes could cause the
same tipping effect, as long as such rumors can not be conclusively rejected as untrue. Since
generals will always be uncertain about whether or how many of their compatriots have accepted
bribes, even the rumored use of bribes may weaken the resolve of unbribed generals to keep
13

David Card, Alexandre Mas and Jesse Rothstein (2006) find econometric evidence of a
tipping point in neighborhood racial dynamics, such that whites begin to exit once the proportion
non-white in a neighborhood exceeds about 13 percent. Abraham Bell and Gideon
Parchomovsky (2000), explore these issues in a legal context. Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter
Siegelman (2004) describe a similar kind of unraveling in the sell-off of the entire town of
Cheshire, OH to a nearby electric utility company whose plant occasionally caused a sulphur
dioxide fog over the town. While many residents would apparently have preferred to stay as long
as others also did, essentially the entire town ended up selling. A similar dynamic mechanism has
also been identified in the analysis of two-tier tender offers. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk (1985).
14

“The money [£1.5 million in bribes] was allocated . . . after the killings of two top
commanders, Mullah Osmani and Mullah Dadullah, and the arrest of Mullah Obaidullah, all
members of the Taliban’s ruling shura, or council. British officials expected this would lead to a
dip in Taliban morale and encourage less extremist members to cross over, fearing that they were
on the losing side—the so-called ‘Dadullah effect’” Lamb (2007).
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fighting. Since the informational environment makes it virtually impossible to determine whether
rumored bribes have actually been paid, it would seem easy to spread such rumors without
paying much at all. And of course if enlisted men could be led to believe that officers are taking
bribes to surrender, this would result in lower morale and internal dissension, amplifying the
effects described above.
We acknowledge that there is much the same possibility for tipping when using bombs
instead of bribes: general X’s belief that generals Y and Z will be defeated increases his
willingness to surrender for just the same reasons as if he believed Y and Z had been bribed.
There is a significant difference in the informational environment between bribes and bombs,
however. Bribes leave no trace, so X might reasonably suspect or fear that Y and Z had been
bribed even if no bribe were actually paid. But for X to take Y and Z’s military defeat seriously
requires that Y and Z actually be defeated, or that his defeat be imminent and credible. Since it is
easier to spread a rumor that bribes have been paid (perhaps without even paying them) than it is
to actually defeat one’s enemy, bribes would seem to have a dynamic advantage over bombs in
addition to the static advantages we discussed earlier.15

1.2 The Historical Background
The use of bribes in warfare has not received any systematic treatment that we know of.16
The payment of money to induce surrender or to prevent attack has clearly been used, at least
sporadically, during the history of military conflict, but it seems highly likely that bribery is often
conducted in secret—for reasons we discuss below—and hence, our attempt to “survey” the
historical landscape is undoubtedly highly incomplete, and probably a biased sample as well.
Table 1 summarizes the main incidents of bribery we were able to uncover (in what we
admit is an unsystematic search).

15

A reader astutely pointed out that by making war cheaper to wage, these dynamic effects
could have the perverse “supply-side” effect of encouraging wars that would otherwise not take
place. Indeed, to the extent that bribery makes warfare less costly for any reason, it could
encourage countries to go to war in situations in which they would otherwise not choose to do so.
We discuss such various supply-side effects in section 3.2.
16

Even Martin Shubik and J. Hoult Verkerke (1989)’s broad-ranging survey of the role of
economics in military strategy does not mention bribery of opposing forces as a possible tactic.
Historians and sociologists have touched on related topics, such as the role of private
entrepreneurs in early Modern European military history. See, e.g., Fritz Redlich, (1965, at 270),
who notes that “[between 1500 and 1800] . . . warfare was business, like piracy and
colonization.” William McNeil (1982) discusses similar issues over a broader chronological and
geographical span. John T. Noonan (1984)’s magisterial intellectual history of bribery makes
only one brief mention of bribery in wartime, noting that “[i]n actual warfare, bribery is a
weapon, less lethal than a bomb, which may justly be employed” (Id., at 694 ).
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Table 1: Chronological Summary of Evidence on Military Bribes
Description
Comments/Source
Several references in Thucydides to
Thucydides
the use of bribes in warfare.
Sack of Rome
Alaric the Visigoth accepted a lavish
He returned the next year and
payment to lift his siege of Rome in 409.
sacked the city. Edward Gibbon (1781,
1994).
Italian City States
Several city-states paid-off groups of
P a yments w e re us ua lly no t
vs. Mercenary Bands, 14th freelance mercenaries not to attack them.
successful, as mercena ries returned to
c.
demand more mo ney. W illiam Caferro
(1996)
Mexican-American
Allegation that Genera l Scott paid
Allegation made by a political rival,
War, 1846-48
Mexican General Santa Ana $10,00 0 to and seen as very dam aging to Scott’s
surrender
honor. Scott denied that such bribe was
paid. N.Y. Times (18 57).
Mexican Civil War,
N.Y. Times reports that rebel leader
“The name of Dob lado will go
1858
Doblado, in command of Salamanca, was down as one of the most despicable in
paid to surrender by the G overnment.
Mexican history.” N.Y. Times (1858 ).
Cuban revolution,
N.Y . Times reports that according to
Evidence is unclear. N.Y. Times
1898
U S S en ato r C a nnon, the Spanish (1898).
government “was afraid to meet the
insurgents in the field,” and had thus
“resorted to a policy of bribery and
starvatio n.”
W orld W ar I
Autobiography of Du tch air craft
Offer was never received, and
designer Anthony Fokker reports that recipient only learned of it later. N.Y.
British offered him £2MM to leave Times (193 1).
Germany and design planes for them.
W orld W ar I
Prime Minister D avid Lloyd George,
A m o u n t n ev er pa id . “ T h e
was prepared to spend £25M M (£200M M i n t e r me d i a r y w a s th e n o to r i o us
in today’s value) to b ribe T urkey into international arms d ealer B asil Zaharoff.
pulling out of World War I in the waning . . . In return for his services [he] was to
mon ths of the camp aign.
get a cut of the money and . . .inclusion in
the British honours system.” Peter Day
(2005).
I t a l ia n / E t h io p i a n
N.Y. Times reports that “Ethiopia was
Evidence unclear. N.Y. Times
War, 1936
not conquered by gas, bombs, or other (1936). See also, Angelo Del Boca
modern weap ons, b ut by internal (1969).
revolutions. . . The majo rity of chiefs
s u c c um b e d to Italian bribe ry o r
propaganda,” accord ing to a Turkish
source.
W orld W ar II
U .S . G eneral McA rthur received
Purpose of payment unclear, but
$500,000 from F ilipino leader on the eave most likely designed to secure personal
of his retre at from the Ph ilippines.
friendship between McA rthur and Filipino
President Quezon. Richard Ed er (1980).
W orld W ar II
Italian invasion of Greece in late 1940
Bribes unsuccessful. Italian invasion
was preceded by payment of millions of lira of Greece was met with strong resistance,
in bribe to Greek generals and officials not and failed before German assistance was
to fight.
called in. Bradley Lightbody (2004).
W orld W ar II
Germany secre tly bribed its ow n
Norma n J. W. Go da (2000 ).
generals to continue fighting: every field
Event
Peloponnesian Wars
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Vietnam, 1965

Afghanistan, 2007

marshal received an extra 4,000 marks and
every four star general an extra 2000 marks
for each month that fighting co ntinued (this
is a 100-200 percent increase over regular
salary).
Letter to the Editor reports that “The
majo rity of roads throughout the country are
unsafe for United States troops. Howe ver,
unarmed, unguarded gasoline trucks can
travel these ro ads unmo lested to deliver
needed fuel for the armed United States
helicopters, merely by tossing b ags of gold
to the Vietcong at various points along the
route.”
Brita in paid out more than £1.5
million to Taliban leaders to surrender as
part o f a “peace-strengthening scheme.”

D. R. W ilson (1965).

Appa rently, no high-ranking leaders
were induced to surrender, although
lower-level soldiers did accept the money.
Some allege that lack of success was
because the bribes offered were not as
large as what the Taliban was paying.
Many Afghans also reacted negatively to
the paym ent of m oney to the enemy.
Christina Lamb (2007).

Several themes emerge from our findings. Chief among them is the importance of secrecy.
Many bribes only came to light long after they were paid. The payment to General MacArthur on
his departure from the Philippines was not reported until 1980, 38 years after it was made.
Payments allegedly made by General Scott during the Mexican-American war were not revealed
for ten years after they were made. A bribe offered to Dutch aircraft designer Anthony Fokker to
defect to England was not made public until more than 15 years after it was allegedly made, and
a potential English bribe to induce Turkey to withdraw from World War I was not revealed until
2005. For obvious reasons, Germany kept secret its bribes to its own generals to keep fighting at
the end of World War II. (We discuss the rationale for secrecy in Section 2.2.)
A second theme, related to the first, is the apparent dishonor involved both in offering and
accepting bribes. Rather than taking the view that successfully bribing one’s enemy is a cheap
and effective way to secure victory, many of the reported uses of bribes were met with
condemnation. Such behavior is seen as shameful, unmilitary, and even unmanly. These views
are apparent in General Scott’s angry and detailed denunciation of the accusation that he obtained
Santa Ana’s surrender in the Mexican-American war by means of a $10,000 bribe. They are also
clear in the denunciations—by American sources—of the use of bribes by other countries: by
Spain in suppressing the Cuban revolution in 1898, by Italy in invading Ethiopia in 1936, and by
the Mexican central authorities in suppressing the Civil War in 1858. (Of course, it is always
difficult to separate opinions about the underlying conflict from opinions about the use of bribery
per se.)
Finally, it seems clear that bribing one’s opponents has had a mixed record of success.
Consider the lavish payment made by Rome to the Visigothic general Alaric in AD 409.
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According to Edward Gibbon (1781, 1994), Alaric “consented to raise [i.e., lift his] siege [of
Rome], on immediate payment of five thousand pounds of gold, of thirty thousand pounds of
silver, of four thousand robes of silk, of three thousand pieces of fine scarlet cloth, and of three
thousand pounds weight of pepper.” (Id. at Vol. III, Ch. 31, p. 191). Unfortunately, Alaric was
back the next year, and the Roman treasury was depleted, so he simply sacked the city.
Similarly, the late medieval Italian city states’ efforts to buy-off the companies of adventure
(roving bands of organized freebooters) rarely secured their security for any extended period.
[B]ribes were usually part of a formal contract between the commune [citystate] and the company [mercenaries] in which the company agreed, among
other things, not to enter local territory for a specific time. The contract in
October 1381 between Siena and the company led by John Hawkwood, for
example, called for a payment of 4,000 florins per month to the company in
return for a promise not to attack Sienese territory for 18 months. These
payments, of course, only encouraged the mercenaries, who took little heed
of their contracts and regularly returned for more loot. Siena, a town singled
out for particular misery, was constrained to buy its freedom 37 times
between 1342 and 1399 (William Caferro, 1996, at 796-97).17
Of course, the real question is the counterfactual one of how Siena would have fared under
some alternative course of action. Given the costs of raising an army (if one could be raised at
all), it is not clear that bribery was a substantially inferior alternative, as Caferro points out.18
(The story of Siena does confirm our suggestion below, that bribes will rarely be successful when
the bribing party is militarily weaker than the recipient.)
The failure of bribery even was more apparent in Mussolini’s invasion of Greece during
World War II. Perhaps the “millions of lire” in bribes destined for Greek generals never reached
their intended recipients, and were simply pocketed by the intermediaries who were supposed to
broker the transactions. Or perhaps the generals took the money but failed to live up to their part
of the bargain. In any case, Italian forces met stiff resistance when they attempted to invade
Greece in 1940, and were unsuccessful until they were bailed out by the Germans. A more recent
example of failed bribes comes from the British attempt to induce Taliban leaders to surrender in
Afghanistan. It is difficult to know why these efforts were unsuccessful, but one can point to a
number of possible reasons, including: the relatively diffuse organizational structure of the
Taliban, the strong ideological motivation of most fighters, the insufficient amounts offered, and
the inability of the British or their allies to enforce performance after a deal was struck.
On the other hand, several of the bribes reported in Table 1 do seem to have met with
success. The Italian campaign in Ethiopia and the Mexican government’s use of bribery during
that country’s Civil War seem to be examples of bribes that accomplished their intended
objectives.

17

Caferro estimates that the total cost of Siena’s bribes was something on the order of
300,000 florins over the 57-year period.
18

A rational, fully-informed mercenary would set his price just below the cost of raising an
army to fight him, so that it would always be barely cheaper to pay than to fight.
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2. BRIBERY AS A CONTRACTING PROBLEM
Wartime bribes present a unique contracting problem because so many of the background
institutions supporting ordinary contracts are largely absent. This, in turn, greatly increases the
transactions costs associated with this kind of deal. As with other types of deals, successful
bribes require the presence of a bargaining surplus, meaning that the briber’s maximum
willingness to pay is larger than the recipient’s minimum asking price. And as is also the case in
more common contractual settings, the existence of a surplus is a necessary but insufficient
condition for a successful bribe, because transactions costs could prevent the realization of a
deal, even when both parties might be willing to form a bargain.
To illustrate, consider a simple contract for the sale of a watch. If the buyer’s reservation
price is higher than the seller’s asking price, and transaction costs are sufficiently low, a deal will
usually be struck between the parties. But in the case of a watch, we typically assume that
background institutional factors supporting contracts are in place and exogenously given.
The same cannot be said for military bribes. Even if his hypothetical asking price is lower
than the bribe offered him to surrender, a general may refuse to accept a bribe from his country’s
opponent because he may fear vengeance by his own countrymen if the story leaks out, or
betrayal by the bribing country. If he were to accept, moreoever, the offeree would presumably
require a higher effective price for surrendering in order to compensate him for the additional
risks that “selling out” would likely cause him to bear.
Such ‘background’ considerations may either be characterized as factors influencing the
seller’s (net) valuation, or instead, as transaction costs that impede the formation of a bargain.
For expository reasons, we distinguish between factors directly affecting valuation and those
influencing transaction costs, while recognizing that these analytic categories are necessarily
somewhat blurry.
2.1. Factors Influencing Willingness to Accept
2.1.1. Ideological Commitment
Ideology is an important determinant of an opponent’s susceptibility to bribes, in much the
same way that an individual’s tastes or preferences determine her willingness to pay for or accept
offers. Commanders who hold strong patriotic or ideological beliefs in the justness of their cause
are less likely to be bribable. War often seems to promote a sense that the enemy is evil and that
one’s own side is operating under divine guidance or otherwise has a monopoly on virtue. But
some conflicts are more ideological than others. Consider the Iran-Iraq war, where thousands of
children were sent to clear minefields by deliberately detonating them with their own bodies,19 or
the Iraqi insurgency, which has made prominent use of suicide bombers. Military leaders who are
willing to give their lives away in the name of ideology are presumptively unlikely to betray it for
19

Matthias Küntzel (2006) discusses the Iranian Basij Mostazafan (“mobilization of the
oppressed”), a volunteer militia consisting of mostly under-18 year olds, which was supposed to
supplement the regular army. “‘The young men cleared the mines with their own bodies,’ one
veteran of the Iran-Iraq War recalled in 2002 to the German newspaper Frankfurter Allgemeine.
‘It was sometimes like a race. Even without the commander's orders, everyone wanted to be
first.’” Even with due allowance for hyperbole, such behavior suggests that bribes paid to these
soldiers not to fight would not be effective.
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monetary rewards, no matter how large. For example, the failure of British efforts to bribe
Taliban leaders in Afghanistan may in part be explained by the strength of the Taliban’s
ideological convictions.20 Put differently, ideologically motivated opponents may be thought of
as having a very high asking price for surrender. Indeed, one functional explanation of ideology
in warfare is as a motivational force that induces behavior that would otherwise seem irrational,
such as willingness to sacrifice one’s life in pursuit of a highly abstract goal.
Divergence in ideologies or religious beliefs within a country or an army may actually
facilitate bribery, however, largely because of the kinds of agency costs we discuss at greater
length below. For example, in the Iran-Iraq war, we suspect that Shiite generals in the Iraqi army
(if there were any) could have been easily bribed by Iran precisely because their religious
ideology was at odds with that of the ruling Iraqi Baath regime. The same is true of strong
feelings of patriotism: on the one hand, patriotism may increase generals’ willingness to accept
bribes. This will be true if generals abhor the ideology and actions of their country’s leaders, and
view them as opposed to the interests of the general population. On the other hand, generals who
act out of patriotism may be especially resistant to bribes, especially if they hope to govern their
country in the future. Bribes and patriotism do not sit well together. True patriots are expected to
shun monetary advances. Furthermore, accepting a bribe will in all likelihood tarnish a general’s
reputation as a patriot in the eyes of his own people if the story leaks out, and make it difficult for
him to achieve the necessary popular support for ruling the country in the future.
Political ideology can also have an effect on the bribing country’s willingness to offer bribes
to its opponents. If the opposition is sufficiently demonized, potential bribers may come to
conclude that recipients must be crushed or eliminated, rather than simply defeated or induced to
surrender. If victory comes to be defined as the enemy’s total destruction, rather than in terms of
some narrower political or military objectives, bribes will be of little use, and would presumably
be seen as counterproductive. (We discuss additional bribe-specific ideological factors below.)
2.1.2. Differences in Wealth
Other things equal, wealthier countries should be more likely to offer bribes, and generals in
poorer countries more likely to accept them. Willingness to pay for opponents surrender
increases with a country’s wealth because opponent’s surrender is probably a normal good: the
wealthier the population in the bribing country, the higher the monetary value it tends to place on
human life (including the lives of its soldiers), and the greater the availability of resources to pay
for bribes. On the receiving end, poor countries presumably have a higher marginal utility of
wealth—a dollar’s worth of bribe goes a lot further in Papua New Guinea (1998 per capita GNP
of $890) than in the United Arab Emirates, where per capita GNP was $17,870, 22 times
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See Lamb (2007). The failure may also have been due to the fact that the bribes were too
small relative to what leaders could expect to earn by sticking with the Taliban. Lamb quotes
one government official who “criticised the international community for not supporting the
programme [to offer payouts to Taliban who would defect.]. ‘I keep telling them we are
absolutely short of funds[.] . . .If we could offer even one fifth of what they’re getting the other
side of the border, many are willing to come over.’”
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higher.21 This should make willingness to accept a bribe higher for poorer countries.
A country’s wealth is likely to have indirect effects on its willingness to pay/accept as well
as direct effects. Generals will presumably be more willing to accept bribes if their opportunity
cost in foregone salary is low. Countries that pay their generals more should thus be less likely to
see them take bribes from their opponents. (Presumably, the military budget is a positive function
of a country’s overall wealth, so wealthier countries can afford to pay higher salaries, reinforcing
the effects described above.) For exactly the opposite reasons, wealthier countries can sustain
larger military budgets, and are therefore better positioned to pay bribes.
2.1.3. Likelihood of Prevailing
Bribes are most likely to be offered when it is reasonably clear that the briber will prevail,
but will face resistance en route to victory. If it is clear that country A will lose a war, there is no
point in its trying to bribe enemy generals to surrender, since they will simply take the bribe and
fight on.22 For this reason, it would have been pointless for Kuwait to try to bribe Iraqi officers
not to invade during the first Gulf war: the Iraqis would likely have pocketed the money and
continued to fight, since Kuwait could not force them to perform or disgorge the amounts
received. In the opposite case, where a potential briber is likely to prevail without facing serious
military resistance, bribes may be offered, but only if the cost of overcoming the resistance by
bribes is cheaper than by overcoming it by military means. Hence, in the armed conflict in
Grenada, the U.S. probably saw no need to offer bribes, since the outcome was a foregone
conclusion. In the second Gulf war, however, the U.S. chose to deploy bribes in addition to more
conventional weapons, both because they were apparently more cost-effective than conventional
weapons and because they improved the likelihood of winning the war.
Even conflicts in which it is initially unclear which side would prevail–World War II, for
example–will often reach a point at which the outcome becomes virtually certain, although
fighting has not yet ended. At such a point, bribes could still be used to speed up the defection of
generals and forestall costly battles.23
2.1.4. Agency Costs and Supervision
Agency costs can loosely be defined as the costs that result from the divergence between a
21

Data are from the World Bank. See,
NK"http://www.worldbank.org/depweb/english/modules/basicdata/datanotbasic.html"http://ww
w.worldbank.org/depweb/english/modules/basicdata/datanotbasic.html, visited June 1, 2007.
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But note the example of 14th century Siena discussed above. With virtually no capacity for
self-defense, Siena repeatedly paid bribes to marauding bands of mercenaries in order to be left
alone; the efficacy of these bribes was apparently limited, since many mercenaries simply
returned and demanded more money. Whether the bribes were actually worse than the feasible
alternatives is a difficult question, however.
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Interestingly, the Nazi regime apparently foresaw this possibility, and paid substantial
“bribes” to keep its own generals fighting during the final phases of the war. See, Norman J.W.
Goda (2000).
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principal’s goals and those of the agents he employs to achieve his purposes. Such costs play
vital, but potentially conflicting, roles in the use of wartime bribes. On the one hand, agency
problems are at the essence of what makes it possible for recipients to accept bribes; but agency
costs may also make it more difficult to offer bribes.
2.1.4.1. Recipients
Agency “slack” is the key to the use of bribes. If enemy commanders have perfectly
internalized the preferences of their governments, or if they are subject to perfect monitoring by
their superiors, they would perforce be unwilling to betray their country in exchange for personal
gain. It is precisely the divergence of interests between commanders and their country (or its
leadership) that makes bribes possible in the first place.
This agency cost view of bribes focuses attention on the organizational structure of the
potential recipients. For example, agency considerations suggest that guerilla forces are likely to
be difficult to bribe because they often adopt a decentralized (cell like) or flat (egalitarian)
organizational structure. Combined with their small size, this makes guerilla forces less subject
to agency “slack,” which enables agents to pursue their own interests at the expense of those of
their organization or their superiors.24 This kind of diffuse organizational structure could be a
factor (among many others we discussed) in the apparent failed attempt by the British to bribe
Taliban leaders.
Conversely, bribery works best in an organizational culture where the loyalty of the troops
runs more to their commanders than to the system as a whole or to professional norms. In a
structure like that of the US Army, generals rotate between commands and their subordinates do
not tend to have strong personal loyalties to them. This means that it would be hard for a bribed
general to “take his men with him,” because they are not really his to command when his
commands run contrary to the country’s interests. That suggests that bribery should work best
when subordinates owe an allegiance to their commander, rather than to the country or its
political leadership. Perhaps in part because of fears of disloyalty (including bribe-taking from
the enemy) the USSR structured its army to make bribery more difficult: every military
commander had a Communist party counterpart, a commissar, one of whose tasks was to shoot
the officer if he wavered from the loyal pursuit of the country’s interests.25
2.1.4.2. Offerors: The Role of Cultural Factors
Agency costs may play a role in the decision to offer bribes, as well as the decision to accept
24

This is not to say, however, that bribes can never be used with respect to guerillas. Bribes
can be an effective means of buying information. Israel, for example, regularly pays Palestinian
informants to provide it with information about planned attacks. Yet because of their cellular
organizational structure, guerilla forces will hardly ever be susceptible to bribes (or, indeed, to
any military force) that cause their total defeat. Decentralization means that to be effective,
bribery must be widespread, since each bribe recipient controls, at most, only those subordinates
in his own cell.
25

We are grateful to Eugene Kontorovich (personal communication on file with authors) for
this suggestion and example.
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them. Even when bribes are the best way to advance a country’s overall politico-military agenda,
they seem to be at odds with the military ethos, at least as it is understood in modern times.26
Today’s soldiers are trained to believe that their job is to advance their country’s interests
through the use of military strength. Such power can be used to deter an enemy attack, or, when
necessary, to defeat the enemy in battle, but it clearly involves the force of arms or the threat to
use such force. Chapter One of the US Army’s “capstone doctrinal manual” begins with a
quotation that stresses the central importance of “putting your young men in the mud” as a means
of defining its vision of what the Army should do.27 Put succinctly, “The Army organizes, equips
and trains Soldiers to fight”28 [and not to bribe].
Bribes represent the intrusion of soft “bourgeois” values—money, profits, greed,
commercialism—that seem inimical to the warrior ethos that most armed forces work hard to
inculcate in their personnel.29 We suspect that military officials on the side likely to offer bribes
might be opposed to doing so purely on the basis that it is not in keeping with their self-image,
even if such bribes were in the interests of the country as a whole. We expect that this factor
might be particularly strong in countries where the military exerts a significant influence on the
26

Historically, the widespread use of mercenaries and the tradition of compensating military
forces via seized booty (rather than regular pay), suggests that at least some commercial values
were not always considered at-odds with military virtue. Indeed, the warrior as proto-capitalist
entrepreneur is a major theme of Redlich’s (1965)’s massive study. Even in the early Modern
period that Redlich discusses, however, there were contradictory views about the appropriateness
of mixing money with warfare. McNeil (1987, at 105) writes that “the men who made [the
ultimate] decisions about raising armies and planning campaigns were utterly out of sympathy
with pecuniary calculations. War was an affair of honor, prestige, heroic self-assertion. To
regulate it according to the grubby selfishness of bankers and moneylenders seemed
fundamentally wrong to the majority of rulers and their ministers.”
27

The full quotation (from T.D. Fehernbach, THIS KIND OF WAR) reads
You may fly over a land forever; you may bomb it, atomize it, pulverize it and
wipe it clean of life—but if you desire to defend it, protect it, keep it for
civilization, you must do this on the ground, the way the Roman legions did, by
putting your young men in the mud.
U.S. Army (2001), at 1.
28

Id. at 6.

29

Political Scientist David A. Baldwin (1971, at 34), noted that
[n]egative sanctions have become psychologically linked with such characteristics
as courage, honor, and masculinity. Soldiers, not diplomats, symbolize masculine
virtues. The statesman who would use positive sanctions [i.e., bribes] risks being
perceived . . . as soft, weak, or lacking in toughness. When the North Koreans
seized the Pueblo, it was ‘unthinkable’ that President Johnson would offer to buy
it back. National honor was at stake. It is ‘honorable’ to fight, but ‘dishonorable’
to buy one’s way out of a fight.
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political system.
Of course, the apparent use of bribes during the second Gulf War demonstrates that this
bias, if it exists, can be overcome under some circumstances. If the problem is that bribes are
considered “un-military,” the obvious solution is to designate intelligence agencies or other nonmilitary branches of the state as the offerors. But bribery may have a bad odor even in these
institutions.30
Bribes are typically shrouded by secrecy, and the obvious rationale for concealing them is to
protect the recipients against retaliation by their countrymen. Another reason for secrecy,
however, might paradoxically be to forestall potential opposition from the bribing side. Bribing
countries can use institutional separation to overcome potential military opposition to the
deployment of “commercial” techniques in warfare.31
2.1.4.3. Secrecy and Accountability
A final agency cost problem posed by the use of bribes arises from the lack of accountability
associated with such payments. Opposing generals presumably do not provide notarized receipts
stating that they have received X dollars, in exchange for which they have agreed to perform
certain specified actions. If such moneys are to be paid, therefore, they will usually be disbursed
on a highly informal basis. This inherent lack of accountability means that it will often be
difficult to be sure that the funds designated for bribes to opposing generals do not end up in the
pockets of those on the bribing side who are supposed to be mere conduits for the money.32 The
30

Writing during the Vietnam war, Baldwin (1971) suggested acerbically that “the
contemporary mores of statecraft seem to make it more moral to drop napalm on a man to
prevent him from becoming a Communist than to bribe him to do the same thing.” Id. at 33. (In
this context, of course, opposition to bribery may have been based as much on a judgment about
its inefficacy as on its perceived immorality.)
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This is not a perfect solution since it could easily lead to coordination problems. For
example, generals might end up attacking opponents who have already agreed to surrender. It is
possible, however, that once the bribe is a “done deal” it may be easier for military officers to
live with it and if so, ex post, they may be informed of bribe recipients. We discuss additional
secrecy issues in Section 2.2.
32

Jon Nordheimer (1985) reported on the trial of former Air Force General Richard B.
Collins, who was accused of “converting $19,000 in interest from . . . [a] secret $450,000 Air
Force fund to his own use while he managed the fund.” The funds were designated “to finance
various Air Force spy operations.” Such off-the-books operations are obviously difficult to
monitor and control. A more notorious example of the diversion of covert funds comes from the
Iran-Contra affair, an operation (conducted in contravention of Congressional authority) in which
funds from secret weapons sales to Iran were routed to support the opposition to the Nicaraguan
government. Col. Oliver North played a key role in this complex series of transactions, and at
least according to Arthur L. Liman (1998),
Adolfo Calero, the head of the Contras, . . .had given some $100,000 in traveler's
checks belonging to the contras to North. . .[presumably as a kind of kick-back for
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payment of bribes therefore has a high potential for fraud or abuse by intermediaries on the
bribing side, which tends to make bribery more costly as a means of warfare.
2.2. Identification and Negotiation Costs
Transaction costs are an obvious impediment to bargains between warring parties. A
country seeking to bribe enemy generals must first be able to identify the potential recipients and
conduct negotiations with them. (Ultimately, of course, both parties must somehow make their
promises to perform credible: we consider these issues in Section 2.3, infra.)
An obvious problem with trying to bribe one’s opponents is that it is difficult to identify the
appropriate “targets” or offerees for a bribe. One solution might be to make public or “at large”
offers, such as by posting an offer on an official website.33 Such a “mass mailing” approach has
some important virtues. First, it makes it substantially easier to identify the relevant persons who
are willing and able to trade military non-performance for money. Second, it might lower the
amounts the briber must pay by creating competition among potential recipients. Third, public
offers could have the effect of demoralizing the enemy; such offers may make enemy generals
suspicious of their peers, and, in the extreme, could lead to either to cleansing campaigns that
weaken the opponent’s army or to the kind of tipping we discussed earlier. Moreover, by making
offers semi-public, offering countries might enhance the enforceability of whatever deals are
struck.34 Finally, open offers would presumably help reduce the accountability issues we
discussed earlier, since offerors would be committed to providing money based on the terms of
the public offer, with less discretion vested in the hands of unsupervised intermediaries.
Yet the fact that we are not aware of any such open offers seems to suggest that the costs of
this strategy outweighs the benefits. What might such costs be, and why are they apparently
considered so large that secret offers are the uniform practice?
One possibility is that open offers of bribes are likely to spur a crackdown by the security
forces of the recipient country, a reaction that could increase the probability of exposing bribe
recipients. This is not necessarily a cost to the offering side, however. Crackdowns by the
security forces of the potential recipient can themselves be useful to the bribe-givers if they cause
brokering the deal]. Richard Secord, one of the Iran-contra conspirators, . . . used
Enterprise funds [Enterprise being the designation for the operation to move
money to the Contras] to pay for a security fence around North's home and [said]
that North created false documents showing that he [North] was the one who’d
paid for the fence.
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The U.S. government’s Rewards for Justice program has paid out more than $62 million
(as of June 1, 2007) for information related to preventing terrorist attacks. There is a $25 million
reward for “information leading to the location, in any country,” of Usama bin Laden or several
of his key aides. See, http://www.rewardsforjustice.net/english/index.cfm?page=Bin_Laden.
34

As we point out in Section 3.3, US courts have refused to grant enforcement of secret
contracts for espionage or other services affecting foreign policy, which has the effect of making
bribes less attractive to recipients. But partially-public contracts—e.g., with offers posted on a
website—might be sufficiently distinguishable to permit enforcement.
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demoralization, suspicion, accusations against innocents, and so on. Another possible downside
to public offers is that if they are unsuccessful, they could provide a propaganda victory to the
receiving side by demonstrating that the potential bribe recipients are actually loyal to the regime
from which the offerors are trying to wean them away.35
We suspect, however, that the main justification for shunning public offers is the desire to
keep them secret from rank and file soldiers and from the general public on the bribing side.
Imagine being a soldier in the trenches somewhere who learns that the enemy general you have
been gearing up to fight has been given $2 million by the government that has sent you into
battle, and is using the money to retire to a life of luxury in Monte Carlo. The general public
might be expected to react similarly to the use of tax moneys for this purpose.
Consider, for example, the headline “Millions for defense, not one cent for tribute.” This
was how contemporary newspapers lauded American diplomats’ refusal to pay a bribe to be
allowed to meet with the French foreign minister to negotiate over the return of US ships seized
by France in 1797.36 Of course, there are many context-specific factors that make it difficult to
generalize from an example such as this. But we suspect that arguments for the cost-effectiveness
of bribery (rather than fighting) will probably not carry much weight with most citizens or
soldiers, and the risk of a backlash against a bribery program—with an attendant loss in
morale—is one of the strongest reasons for keeping offers secret.
Given the practice of secrecy, a country seeking to use bribes must expend resources on
identifying and verifying potential recipients. As in many markets, search costs are probably
asymmetric. (It is generally easier for workers to locate firms with job openings than it is for
firms to locate interested and qualified workers; similarly, in attempting to secure permission for
reproduction of copyrighted material, it is easier for copyright holders to find Google than for
Google to find the widely-dispersed copyright holders.) Hence, we would ordinarily expect
potential bribe recipients to disclose themselves to (solicit bribes from) potential offerors, rather
than vice-versa.
Naturally, not all enemy personnel are similarly situated in terms of their ability to affect the
outcome of a war. The optimal bribe recipients are those who are in charge of forces defending
important posts or strategic targets. Of course, commanders occupying such positions are
presumably chosen for their loyalty to their regime. This implies that the most desirable
recipients of bribes may often be the least likely to accept them. It also means that a country
seeking to use bribes must proceed with caution, since contacting the wrong person could result
in loss of lives, false information, or a “deal” that the recipient has no intention of honoring.
There are also classic adverse selection concerns: when potential recipients decide whether to
come forward and identify themselves by soliciting bribes, offerors must worry that those
expressing a willingness to accept bribes are the least-valuable among potential recipients.
35

One wonders whether the relative lack of significant results from the Rewards for Justice
program has perhaps strengthened the position of the groups being targeted.
36

The famous line has often been attributed to Charles Pinckney, an American envoy to
France. However, Pinckney’s response to the request for a bribe was actually, “No, no, not a
sixpence.” See, William Stinchcombe (1977). The import of the remark is obviously unchanged,
however.
20

Once potential recipients have been identified, it is possible to proceed to the negotiations
phase. Here too secrecy presents a major cost. While it is true that modern communication
technologies, such as cell-phones and the Internet may facilitate private communications with
bribe targets, they do not reduce negotiation costs to zero. The existence of special forces units,
who can operate behind enemy lines and verify the identities of bribe recipients, negotiate in
person, and deliver or pick-up sensitive documents, can serve as a useful complement to
communications technology.
2.3. Enforceability
2.3.1. Extra-Legal Enforceability
Both offerors and recipients of bribes face an extreme version of the commitment problem
that bedevils many contractual arrangements. When the two sides’ performance are not
completely synchronized (one party must perform, or sink unrecoverable costs, before the other
does), the second party will sometimes have an incentive to renege on its end of the bargain. For
example, if the recipient of a bribe is paid up-front for a promise not to order his troops to fight
in the future, he may find it in his interest to collect the money but keep on fighting regardless of
his commitment not to do so. The reverse is also true—if a commander surrenders first, in
exchange for a promise of funds after his side has been defeated, the offeror will have relatively
little incentive to pay when the time comes. Since neither side can credibly commit to keeping its
end of the bargain in the future, both parties may stay out of “deals” which would be in their
mutual interests if enforcement were certain.
Moreover, most of the normal mechanisms for preventing such commitment problems are
unavailable in the case of bribes. For example, parties often rely on the threat to terminate a
valuable relationship to prevent opportunistic behavior such as taking the money and then
refusing to perform.37 But since there are few, if any, long-run relationships between members of
opposing military forces, there is correspondingly little ability to use the threat of terminating the
relationship as a means of securing performance.
Similarly, it is a commonplace that a reputation for keeping one’s word can also serve as a
credibility-enhancing device, since opportunistic behavior will cause a loss of a capital
asset—reputation for honesty—that can be immensely valuable in dealings with other parties.
Again, however, reputational concerns are of relatively little importance in secret, one-shot
transactions.
A combination of trusted third parties, technology allowing for rapid communications, and a
high probability of victory might alleviate the enforceability problem to some extent, however.
For example, the offeror could deposit the money with a trusted third party (e.g., a Swiss bank)
and give the offeree an opportunity to verify unconditional and irreversible payment. This should
mitigate the recipient’s fear of non-payment. A high probability of victory should attenuate the
offeror’s concern that the recipient will take the money and run: once the offering country gains
possession of the enemy’s territory, it can seek out the offeree and punish him for defecting, or
37

Benjamin Klein and Keith Crawford (1981) model how the possible loss of surplus from
repeat play can motivate parties to perform contracts, even in the absence of judicial
enforcement. Based on interviews with businesspersons, Stewart Macaulay (1963) also argues
for the importance of relationship-preservation (and reputation) in securing good behavior.
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retaliate against his family or kin.
2.3.2 Legal Enforceability
In this subpart, we discuss the legal enforceability of bribes both under public international
law and under U.S. law. We show that while international law does not bar the use of bribes, the
U.S. Supreme Court, by declaring secret contracts with foreign agents unenforceable on public
policy grounds, has erected a potentially serious obstacle for bribe-paying.
2.3.2.1. Public International Law
In its relevant part, public international law is organized around the distinction between
perfidy and ruses of war.38 Article 37(1) of the Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Convention
declares it illegal to “kill, injure or capture an adversary by resort to perfidy.” The article defines
perfidy as “[a]cts inviting the confidence of an adversary to lead him to believe that he is entitled
to, or is obliged to accord, protection under the rules of international law applicable in armed
conflict, with intent to betray that confidence.” Examples of perfidy include the feigning of an
intent to negotiate under a flag of surrender or the feigning of incapacitation or non-combatant
status. However, in order to constitute perfidy, the aforementioned acts must be “a proximate
cause of the killing, injury or capture of the enemy (W. Hays Park [2003]).
By contrast, public international law recognizes the legitimacy of ruses of war (Hague
Convention IV, Annex art 24; J.M. Spaight [1911]). Article 37(2) of the Protocol specifically
provides that “ruses of war are not prohibited.” The article defines ruses of war as “acts which
are intended to mislead an adversary or to induce him to act recklessly but which infringe no rule
of international law applicable in armed conflict and which are not perfidious because they do
not invite the confidence of an adversary with respect to protection under the law.” Examples of
acts or measures that come within the category of ruses of war include the use of spies and secret
agents, the inducement of enemy soldiers to desert, surrender or rebel, and (at least according to
the U.S. Army) even the use of bribes (Department of the Army (1956), at 22 para. 49).
The Army’s position on bribes is probably correct. Bribes are not intended to instill false
confidence in enemy soldiers in order to later kill or injure them. On the contrary, as we have
explained, the effect (if not the purpose) of bribes is to spare life and avoid harm to persons and
property. Of the various means of warfare, bribes are by far the least lethal and destructive.
Therefore, international law should have no reason to ban bribes. As we shall see in the
following subsection, however, the U.S. Supreme Court has recently adopted a position with
dramatically different consequences for the use of bribes.39

38

This distinction apparently originates in chivalric law. See, Thomas C. Wingfield (2001).

39

We note in passing that bribery by the US military is also not covered by the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act., which was designed to control the commercial operations of U.S.
businesses, not the federal government. The Act “criminalized the bribery of foreign officials by
U.S. corporations and individuals pursuing business in other countries and required that
companies with publicly-traded stock meet certain standards regarding their accounting practices,
books and records, and internal controls” (Andrea Dahms & Nicolas Mitchell (2007), at 605-06).
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2.3.2.2. U.S. Law
Most readers will probably assume, as we initially did, that secret bribes paid to foreign
commanders could not possibly be legally enforceable as contracts, at least in American courts.
Surprisingly, these contracts might well have been considered legally binding, at least until
relatively recently. Yet in two decisions, Tenet v. Doe (544 U.S. 1 [2005]), and its antecedent,
Totten v. United States (92 U.S. 105 [1876]), the Supreme Court has ruled that secret contracts
implicating national security could not be adjudicated in US courts.
The Does were (apparently) a husband and wife who were diplomats for an unnamed
Eastern European country. After approaching the CIA in an effort to defect to the US, they were
recruited to serve as spies, in return for which they were promised “travel to the United States
and . . . financial and personal security for life.” The Does apparently performed their end of the
‘bargain,’ and once they arrived in the US, they were initially taken care of by the CIA. After
several years, however, Mr. Doe lost his job, and the CIA refused to provide him with further
assistance. When the couple sued for breach of contract, the Agency argued that courts had no
power to hear the case or grant a remedy.
The Supreme Court agreed, citing Totten for the proposition that “public policy forbade a
self-styled Civil War spy from suing the United States to enforce its obligations under their secret
espionage agreement” (Tenet, 544 U.S., at 1). The Tenet court thus denied that there was any
remedy at all for breach of a secret government agreement with a covert agent. Although Totten
had earlier recognized the President’s power to authorize secret deals of this kind, it had also
concluded that
[b]oth employer and agent must have understood that the lips of the other were to be
for ever sealed respecting the relation of either to the matter. This condition of the
engagement . . . is implied in all secret employments of the government in time of war,
or upon matters affecting our foreign relations, where a disclosure of the service might
compromise or embarrass our government in its public duties, or endanger the person
or injure the character of the agent. If upon contracts of such a nature an action against
the government could be maintained in the Court of Claims, whenever an agent should
deem himself entitled to greater or different compensation than that awarded to him,
the whole service in any case, and the manner of its discharge, with the details of
dealings with individuals and officers, might be exposed, to the serious detriment of
the public (Totten, 92 U.S., at 106-107 [emphasis added]).
Totten and Tenet together seem to imply that a secret “contract” for sensitive services, the
existence of which might implicate national security concerns, is voidable at will by the US
Government. As such, it is in some sense no contract at all, since it is binding only as long as the
promisor wishes to be committed to its terms.
Although bribes paid to foreign generals not to oppose US forces might be distinguishable
from bribes paid to espionage agents, it is hard to see the basis for this distinction. Totten seems
to apply to “all secret employments of the government in time of war, or upon matters affecting
our foreign relations” (emphasis added), which on its face extends to bribes paid to foreign
generals. In some sense, moreover, the issue is not whether bribes paid to foreign generals would
be found unenforceable per se. Rather, the issues is whether foreign generals would reasonably
worry that their “contracts” would be unenforceable if the US were to change its mind. The
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holdings in Totten and Tenet do make such worries reasonable, even if the situations might
somehow be distinguishable.
It seems clear, then, that from an ex ante/contractarian perspective, Totten and Tenet were
wrongly decided. Both cases make it more difficult for the US government to credibly commit to
the terms of any covert deals it enters into with foreign military figures. Of course, quasi-public
bribes, such as the “playing cards” used to denote insurgent leaders for whom we were offering
rewards, can probably overcome the secrecy that blocks enforcement according Totten and Tenet.
But public rewards face problems of their own, as we noted earlier, and anything that makes
performance of the money-for-surrender “contract” less certain makes bribes less attractive to the
recipient, and hence undermines the efficacy of bribery as a form of warfare.40
3. FACTORS ARGUING AGAINST THE USE OF BRIBES
In this Part, we consider possible objections to the use of bribes. We focus on the effect of
bribes on domestic morale and the ex ante effects of bribes on armies decisions to initiate armed
conflict and on how to fight them.
3.1. Domestic Morale?
One drawback of using bribes to induce enemy forces to surrender is the potential cost in
morale on the offeror’s side. Paying the enemy large sums of money not to fight–even if it saves
lives on the side offering the bribe–could reduce the willingness of the offeror’s own soldiers to
continue fighting. Part of what allows a country to conduct war in the first place is a shared sense
that the enemy is worth opposing, and a shared commitment to defeating the opponent. If instead
of vanquishing its enemy, a country were to selectively buy-off the opposing forces, it would
doubtless strike many as unjust. Allowing Nazi generals or leaders of Saddam Hussein’s
Republican Guard to escape defeat and punishment and to retire unmolested to Switzerland as
millionaires would strike many as wrong, and could easily undermine the conviction necessary to
sustain a fighting force. These “demoralization” costs might be experienced either by soldiers
themselves, or by the civilian population. In either case, using bribes could be counterproductive
for the bribing country.
More generally, bribery seems to be inimical to the definition of virtue cultivated by military
cultures the world over. A culture focused on heroism, valor, armed prowess, and similar virtues
is at odds with the kind of bourgeois commercial mentality associated with using bribes.
An obvious remedy for these kinds of problems is secrecy. If soldiers (and the general
public) in the bribing country never learn about the offer of bribes—or only learn after the end of
the conflict—the possibility for a negative effect on the conduct of the war is essentially
eliminated. (There might nevertheless be a retroactive political backlash against such policies.)
Bribes cannot be kept secret from everyone, but by designating a non-military agency (such as
40

Of course, other countries may not have Tenet-like precedents, so bribe-recipients might
be able to turn to other fora to seek enforcement of covert agreements not to fight. And in light of
Tenant and Totten, the US might simply respond by offering larger up-front payments to
compensate for the risk of subsequent unenforceability. (Such up-front payments have problems
of their own, however, the most obvious being that they increase the cost of the bribe, and raise
issues about possible non-performance by the recipient.)
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the CIA) to offer bribes, their secrecy from most of the military can be preserved, and their
demoralization costs can be minimized.
3.2. Ex Ante Effects?
A second set of possible drawbacks to the use of bribes is that they may lead to undesirable
ex ante effects. For example, a country that developed a widespread reputation for paying-off its
enemies to go away when attacked, rather than fighting back, might run the risk of becoming a
target for extortion.41 This kind of dilemma confronted some weak but wealthy regimes during
the medieval era, as we noted earlier, but we know of no actual instance in modern times when
one country declared war on another just be paid to go away; and such behavior seems rather
implausible. Conversely, bribery could also have perverse effects in the other direction: by
making war cheaper to wage, the widespread use of bribery could conceivably increase the
incidence of warfare. This, too, strikes us as implausible. In most cases, the savings from bribery
will be quite small in comparison to the overall costs of war, especially because, as we noted
already, bribes are a complement to military strength rather than a substitute for it.42
On the other hand, the presence of bribery does open up various possible distortions in
decision-making at echelons of the military below the national level. Consider, for example, the
report that Chechens offered bribes to Russian soldiers to spare their villages during the fighting
in Chechnya.
In the Chechen village of Kater-Yurt, locals say they paid a top Russian
military official about 150,000 rubles ($5,555) and a big-screen television as
a bribe to spare their homes from shelling and looting. In another village,
Kulary, locals say they offered up tribute of basic foodstuffs, including sugar,
meat and flour. And in Achkhoi-Martan, locals say bombs rained down on
their homes until someone passed the hat around the community and
41

A version of this scenario is described in Leonard Wibberley (1955)’s satirical novel THE
MOUSE THAT ROARED , in which the tiny and backward Duchy of Grand Fenwick declares war on
the US in order to lose, thereby making it eligible for Marshall plan-like reconstruction
assistance.
42

Moreover, clever use of bribes can forestall some of the moral hazard problems they might
otherwise create. Bribes can be structured so as to create a kind of prisoner’s dilemma that
eliminates most of the incentive to solicit them by extortion. Suppose, for example, that there are
four enemy divisions. The offeror could announce that it will randomly bribe only two divisions
and refuse to accept the surrender of the other two, so that there is no net ex ante incentive to go
to war in the first instance. We thank Ian Ayres for this insight (personal communication).
As Ayres points out, this strategy faces some credibility problems, however, since the
offeror must commit to actually fighting the unbribed divisions, rather than merely accepting
their surrender. Otherwise, the ex ante incentive is not eliminated. But it may not be optimal (or
legal) to refuse to accept the surrender of the unbribed divisions when the time to do so comes
around, which makes the entire deal non-credible. Ayres (1997) offers an extended treatment of
the difference between bribes and extortion (in the context of judicial bribery), which is relevant
in this context.
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gathered an unspecified amount for a bribe—and once it was paid, the
shelling stopped (Yevgenia Borisova, [2000]).
In a regime with weak control over its military (and impoverished soldiers), it is not hard to
imagine that soldiers might be lead to deliberately extort bribes from selected targets, or to
deviate from approved strategic goals in order to shake-down a village or a wealthy individual.
For example, it is possible that Achkhoi-Martan was attacked not for any valid strategic reason,
but simply so that the villagers could be induced to pay to stop the shelling. 43 This possibility
strikes us as not so much a reason to oppose bribes, as to require a tight chain of command that
restricts such behavior as much as possible.
Finally, while bribes may sometimes have undesirable ex ante effects, it is vital to
distinguish between bribes paid to a country ‘as a whole’ (or its commander in chief) to dissuade
it from pursuing its objectives (as in the case of Roman bribes to Alaric or Sienese bribes to
Hawkwood’s company), and bribes paid to subordinates to induce defection from the pursuit of
these objectives (as in US bribes to Iraqi generals). For example, it has been suggested—in some
cases facetiously—that the West should have bought out Saddam Hussein, rather than invading
Iraq in the second Gulf war.44 Others have opined that rather than threatening to attack North
Korea, the US should simply offer money to the Korean government to give up its nuclear
weapons.45 These kinds of bribes might produce an unwelcome “supply side” response, however,
encouraging other nations to develop such weapons so that they too can be paid-off. But paying
subordinates to defect from their superiors’ plans should have the exact opposite supply side
effect: these bribes make attacks more difficult to sustain, and would thus deter, rather than
encourage, potential attackers.
CONCLUSION
Economists have explored in great depth the “make or buy” choice faced by firms deciding
whether to vertically integrate or to purchase inputs on the open market. In this Essay, we have
sought to highlight the presence of a “destroy or buy” dilemma confronted by politicians and
generals in times of war.
Carl Von Clausewitz famously noted that “war is nothing but the continuation of politics by
other means.” Implicit in this statement is that war is of a piece with the negotiation and dealmaking that are at the heart of politics. But even if war represents a kind of bargaining failure, it
is worth remembering that partial bargaining can dramatically reduce the costs of military
43

We hasten to add that we have no evidence that this actually occurred, and are simply
speculating.
44

Keith Hartley (n.d.) proposed that we should have paid $20 Billion to Saddam Hussein to
leave Iraq, instead of invading. Gary Brecher (2006), writing as War Nerd, makes a similar
proposal, tongue-in-cheek, as does Mark Kleiman (2007).
45

James D. Miller (May 2003) points out that paying-off North Korea might encourage other
countries to develop nuclear weapons, or to threaten do so, so that they too could get paid off.
Even if that did occur, paying other countries to drop their atomic weapons programs might not
be as costly as the alternatives, Miller concludes.
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campaigns. We have demonstrated that under plausible circumstances, such partial bargaining is
possible, and moreover, that it can outperform traditional weaponry as means of deciding
military campaigns.
Bribes to enemy commanders can sometimes determine the outcome of wars without
spreading devastation and risking collateral harms, and can do so at a lower cost than traditional
weapons, or even their “smart” counterparts. In addition, the use of bribes can lower acrimony
and resentment between the warring parties, and thereby facilitate future cooperation. We have
also delineated the limitations of bribes. Bribes will not be as effective in campaigns against
guerilla forces (but neither will conventional warfare), and are likely to be less effective when the
enemy shares a strong ideological or religious commitment. Yet, our analysis reveals that bribes
have been used in military campaigns throughout history. More importantly, perhaps, it
establishes a prima facie case to increase their use in the future.
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